Research Catalog

Title

Pay without performance : the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation / Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.

Author

Bebchuk, Lucian A.,

Publication

Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2004.

Items in the Library & Off-site

Details

Additional Authors

Fried, Jesse M.

Description

xii, 278 pages; 25 cm

Summary

"Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of executives' power to influence their own pay - and of the structural defects in corporate governance that give them this power. As this book demonstrates, boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried give a richly detailed account of how pay practices - from option plans to retirement benefits - have decoupled compensation from performance and camouflaged both the amount and the performance-insensitivity of pay. They show that flaws in pay arrangements and the pay-setting process have been widespread and systemic. These problems have hurt shareholders both by increasing pay levels and, even more important, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives."--Jacket.

Subjects

• Führungskraft
• Vorstand
• Corporate governance
• Leidinggevend personeel
• Salaires > Cadres (Personnel)
• Gouvernement d'entreprise
• Unternehmen
• Executives > Salaries, etc
• USA
• Beloningen
• Rémunération des cadres
• Gehalt
• Rendement au travail
• Topmanager
• Salarissen
• Angemessenheit
• Corporate Governance
• Lohn
• Directeuren
• Leistungsmessung
• Prestaties

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references (pages 257-270) and index.

Processing Action (note)

• Self-Renewing

Contents

The official view and its shortcomings -- Power and pay -- Decoupling pay from performance -- Going forward.

ISBN

• 0674016653
• 0674022289
• 9780674022287

LCCN

• 9780674016651
• 2004052253

Owning Institutions

Columbia University Libraries