



**Islam In Europe**

**Insult: Fractured States?**

**Part 5: Conclusions: Where Do We Go From Here?**

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**South Court Auditorium**

**LIVE from the New York Public Library**

**[www.nypl.org/live](http://www.nypl.org/live)**

**FLASH ROSENBERG:** Hello everyone, welcome. My name is Flash Rosenberg, and I'm Artist in Residence for LIVE from the New York Public Library. You may be thinking, an artist in residence, what on earth would somebody like that do? Well, it happened because I was you. I was sitting in the audience and I was struck by how these LIVE programs are more than just lectures, that something very active happens, and it's not just visible. I mean, yeah, people are sitting out there, people are sitting up here, it looks like a lecture. But in this room there's a kind

of new energy, for what could be happening during discussion. So conversations here happen not just on stage, but between strangers sitting next to each other, and within each person

I draw how I understand the talks. What I draw are not caricatures, it's not court reporting. At times it's not even accurate. It's like being a listener. I want to capture how the ideas look. I call my work conversation portraits. I combine text with the doodling, because I write the words until the alphabet is insufficient. Then I make it more abstract, it becomes drawing. Then the drawing needs to be more specific so it goes back into words. So you'll see it undulating.

Tonight I'll be drawing the conversation between the panelists. And that strange equipment you were all sort of grunting at as you had to walk past it—the drawing is being videotaped as it occurs, and then later on I edit it, to get the key moments to match up with the audio, so you can see something like the next two animations that I'm going to be presenting. You're going to see them representing live conversations that happened before from talks you may have missed, and you'll see a little bit of what is being created tonight. Thank you.

**(screening of *Who is Mark Twain?*)**

**viewable at <http://theharperstudio.com/authorsandbooks/marktwain/>)**

**(screening of *Standard Operating Procedure*)**

**viewable at <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f5Tkz21Eo6I>)**

**ZEYBA RAHMAN:** That was absolutely wonderful, thank you Flash. I felt as though I was there for that conversation that Paul led. And now ladies and gentlemen, we come to the concluding session of our Islam in Europe program, and it's been a really exciting, enlightening series of sessions, with very intelligent questions afterwards, it's been really a joy to be here.

Before we bring our panelists on, I'd like to thank our very generous host, Paul Holdengräber, the Director of LIVE from the New York Public Library. Thank you Paul. I'd also like to thank the European Union National Institutes for Culture, and the head of that network, Gabrielle Becker. Thank you Gabby. Our compadre in this venture, Martin Rauchbauer, and Mahnaz Fancy. Thank you very much, it's been wonderful working with you. It's been a really remarkable partnership over a very important issue, Islam in Europe, with its subtitle, Insult: Fractured States. This exploration of how we got here, the history, the colonization, the immigration, and how those elements played into migration and policy, the response, the reaction, which is now the status quo, and also looking at the future, the youth, how young people can help shape what happens in Europe and the world. Many of you were here for the media panel, which was also very lively. How media can serve as a catalyst for change.

So the question is, where do we go from here? We are fragile and imperfect creatures, and very often, when we are pushed we become desperate. We're not born desperate, we become desperate. And in that desperation, we do one of two things: we either turn towards rather negative and sometimes violent action, the results of which we all know here, and we can also help to launch movements, and so channel that desperation in a very positive way.

To take this to the next step I'm going to ask my compadre Paul Holdengräber to come up here and lead the panel about where we can go from here.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** I am going to call my panelists to come up and I will place them, and then I will hopefully instigate this conversation. Any reactions to that conversation you saw illustrated, between Errol Morris and Philip Gourevitch?

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** I think these sketches were not only provocative and informative, but also factual. It gives me the impression that Abu Ghraib made it possible to understand what domination can do, how people can be hurt and insulted. That provoked the debate throughout the world, and that's what Linda England was, after all, prosecuted, and led to whatever fate it had.

But it also made the point of how an individual can do to the other individual, where, as we were talking about earlier, mutual respect has gone. It reminds us that we should be thinking very seriously on these issues.

**BENJAMIN BARBER:** There is a literature of terrorism that encompasses almost everything that's been written, that says if you're looking for a single word to explain the hatred, resentment, and murderous intent of terrorists, it's the word humiliation. Humiliation is what causes people to go off. This isn't a way to excuse terrorism, but a way to explain it. I think Abu Ghraib came to *mis*-define, actually, the war within the United States, because the United States was seen, in terms of Abu Ghraib, exclusively in terms of humiliation. There has never been a

better portrait of humiliation, and the comic rendering of it in this film was remarkable, because by making it into a kind of comic piece, it made even more horrendous the poignancy of that humiliation.

I think it points to the centrality of humiliation, and the dialectic between those who become terrorists, and who see themselves, namely us, as victims of terrorisms, though often in one way or another are complicit in forms of humiliation that we don't even see. These are obvious and here the humiliation was obvious, but there are other subtler forms of humiliation.

The word that jumps out from this, jumps out from Abu Ghraib, jumps out from eight years of a policy, which whether you agree with it or not, that term humiliation is core, and says a lot.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Any other thoughts? Before I jump into the subject at hand, which may have to do with humiliation, may have to do with terrorism?

**BAS HEIJNE:** One of the authors ended the conversation by saying that perhaps humiliation was the purpose of the invasion, perhaps more than the other purposes that were given. And then he said, well what does that mean? And then he didn't answer. Perhaps he did answer in the real conversation, but I think that's a very interesting point to make.

When we talk about humiliation, we just heard about perception, about images in the last conversation. I think in a way, the Americans felt humiliated. There is a kind of deep resentment, sense of humiliation that is active everywhere. We talk about Europe, and it's not only a sense

of—it's one of the hidden emotions behind all these discussions about freedom, liberty, threats of identity. That's a very important point that he made: This need to humiliate is much stronger than people care to admit.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** I was very pleased Bas, that Zeyba had the courage for the first time, I don't know why it took so much courage, to actually mention the subtitle of these proceedings. We gave it the subtitle of *Insult: Fractured States*. Now, the word terrorism, when it came up with Paul Berman yesterday, everybody shuddered, and didn't want to really go there, as much as we have already now. The word insult stayed out, nobody mentioned the subtitle, and I was wondering why.

Jocelyn, do you know the origin of the word insult? It's quite interesting, I looked it up because of my inclination, my training, I thought, we need to look it up. The word insult comes from *insultare*, to leap upon, scoff, from *salire* to be salient, pointing outward, prominent. So the question for me is, who feels insulted? Who is insulting?

**JOCELYN CESARI:** I thought it was a very good way to capture the situation in Europe today, insult and fracture. Because we can say that Muslims feel insulted, and we have in mind the last episode of the Danish cartoon and how it became global and so on, but doing all these surveys across Europe, what we see a lot also is non-Muslims feeling insulted or threatened by the lifestyle of some Muslims. So we have to take really into account these two mutual senses of insult and fragility and threat to the ontological self. And when I talk to lots of European young people who are not Muslims, they feel threatened—and someone said this in the previous

panel—by Muslims who look more solid in the way they can act and behave in the name of their faith or norms, and I think this is seen as a threat.

On the other way around, Muslims feel, and with good reason, Muslims feel insulted by the way they can be treated when they express this faith. If we want to have a real picture of the situation of Islam in Europe, we have to look at both. We cannot want to just treat one part of the equation and ignore the others. Unfortunately, that's not what's happening in the research, it's not what's happening in political discourse, it's not even what's happening in the media. Usually we tend to give favor to one point of view or the other, but there is a need to overcome the fracture today and to be more inclusive. To bring these two together, not discount one over the other.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Do you believe then, that having a firm identity is a threat? Did I understand you well?

**JOCELYN CESARI:** No, being *perceived* that way. All situations are related to perception and projection. Islam is described, and I will maybe insist a little more about that later, is really seen as a sort of block, as a monolithic entity that builds someone. Like a building block, like a lego. This can be seen as dangerous. And I have heard lots of people, I was talking to my colleague about the Netherlands. You go to the Netherlands, sexual minorities, gays, they feel threatened maybe by a Muslim neighbor. It's wrong, it doesn't maybe have any ground, but they feel also this threat. This is the kind of thing you have to take into account in the crisis around Islam today.

So insult and fracture? Yes, Muslims are insulted. Islam and Muslims may be ghettoized. And I want to make a difference here: we should not consider equal Islam and Muslims. I think there is an Islamic issue, Muslims are not an issue. I can explain that. But you have also the other part, and it showed in the last results of the European elections. This is also a sign of a sense of threat and fear.

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** I will say that from a Muslim point of view, Muslims need to recognize their own wrongs as well. I also begin in the recent history—it was the Iranian Revolution when they made ambassadors of this country hostages. The US was hurt and insulted. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, then the Muslim world became insulted and fractured altogether, because ‘infidels’ had been invading a Muslim country, predominantly. A poor country, in that way. And when Salman Rushdie wrote *Satanic Verses* it insulted the whole Muslim world by writing a fiction but making a point by which Muslims could be insulted.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Did it insult you?

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** It insulted me very much. I had a debate with him three times, on radio, TV, and also face to face in a place like this, openly, before February 1989.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** And you read it? Unlike some people who were offended before they had read it?

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** Of course, I read it before it was even printed. Cover to cover. I was actually one of the five persons who were given the advanced copy to read and give my reaction, and I gave a written reaction to Penguin that it should not be published, including Khushwant Singh from India, who said it should not be published, because not only did it humiliate Muslims, but Muslims will be in uproar and it will be insulting. Because the book itself would have been written without what we call the accuracy of the story. Putting God and the Devil the other way around, it would have been different. But he meant to insult, especially the wives of the Prophet, peace be upon him, and then Medina. So that type of issue was very much insulting to all of us, because it's a second article of faith that no one can insult Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him. That's really central.

But what I am saying, the Danish cartoon has been mentioned, I don't want to repeat. Pope Benedict mentioned Islam as an evil that is spread by the sword. Those type of historians' statements are for the 15<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, and could not be repeated in this type of age and situation without going unnoticed.

Anti-Semitism is insulting to not only my Jewish colleagues, but to Muslims as well, because we are Semitic in one way. And Islamophobia is insulting to Muslims because of degradation, humiliation, and it's a hate. I say always that hate is a plague of Europe. Unless we all get together to cure it, this will become an institution. In the previous century, Jews suffered, not because their color was different, not because any other things about them were different, other than that their language was Yiddish and they eat kosher food. Muslims are suffering today, as Jocelyn has mentioned, because of exactly the same nature. We need to address these fractured

states in which we live, so that we have a mutual respect and understanding for each other, and work together to address this issue of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, because where there is anti-Semitism, Islamophobia is not far away, and where there is Islamophobia, anti-Semitism is not far away.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Khaled Fouad Allam, hatred is a plague of Europe?

**(KHALED FOUAD ALLAM spoke in Italian. His comments were translated into English by translator Michael Moore)**

**KHALED FOUAD ALLAM:** An insult is a product of a conflict. It's true that there is a symmetry in the form of the insults, both by the Islamic side and the Western side.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** I do want to say that it's wonderful that we're going from Italian to French, and I'm just wondering—this is not a fractured state, this is marvelous. I think it's quite wonderful. I like this. And next it will be Dutch.

**KHALED FOUAD ALLAM:** Researchers who study internet are very aware of the reciprocal nature of these. But I do believe that the type of insult, the category of insult of the West toward Islam operates on a different level. I myself have been subject to threats and insults because I was a member of the Italian parliament and because I write for the newspaper *La Repubblica*. But I think the very big question in the relationship between Islam and the West is the question of the relationship between history and memory. Islam has history, but does not have the shared memory. Hence arise the immense cultural problems that today become political problems.

Overcoming insult means overcoming the divorce between history and memory that is in the West.

Today's situation is very fragmented. Because what is happening in Europe is fomenting more and more insults, which I consider the birth of symbolic borders. This explains the growth as we've seen in the recent European elections of extremist and nationalist parties. So the insult is present both within Islam but also in the relationship between the West and Islam. But the categories within which insults operate are different. Also because within Islam there is a contemporary crisis. The question of democracy, of freedom, etc. And of individual rights. Which provokes a kind of insult within Islam. So many, not just, writers are insulted by Muslims themselves. But what is more complicated than the relationship between Islam and the West is Islam and Europe. Because we are in the very depth of what cultural relations are. And it's very hard to come out of them.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** I'm curious about this notion of no shared memory. I'm not 100% sure why you mentioned that, because to me—going back to something I know a little more about, I know very little about what we're talking about today, I'm going to try and do my best with all of your communal knowledge—but there was a time in 19<sup>th</sup> century where great writers, I'm thinking particularly of the German Romantics, the French, whether it was the 17<sup>th</sup> century with Montesquieu and Voltaire in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and then in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the Romantics, had a real sense of speaking of the Orient. Even though the Orient was kept away, they somehow entered the consciousness. Now we have the immigrants living within the borders of Europe and

it seems they've pushed away the understanding of that consciousness. So I'm wondering, what provoked that shift?

**JOCELYN CESARI:** If I may pick up on that, I would be a little more harsh with this literature. It's a wonderful literature, I grew up on it. Because it's again, what are we talking about? We are talking about a topos, which is an imaginary place where you put Islam and Muslims, but this doesn't reflect the reality of people. It's part of the imaginary of the West, and we know very well through historians that, for example, Western Europe has built itself in this relationship of competition with the Muslim world in the Mediterranean area. The modernity of Europe came from confronting the Ottoman Empire. And we know all that, through the different episodes of that, and what it means is that all the terms we are proud of, like democracy, equality, progress, have been built against, in the mirror of the image of the Ottoman Empire.

I'm going to give you just a few examples. The term fanaticism, that we use so much today. The first occurrence of it, 1688, associated with the Prophet Muhammad. It doesn't come with the Rushdie affair, it doesn't come with the cartoon crisis. Voltaire, I'm sorry, I'm going to turn to French because it's the original title, *Le Prophet Muhammad et l'esprit du Fanatisme*. 1688. The Prophet Muhammad and the Spirit of Fanaticism. This is 1688.

Despotism. Today this is a term we use to describe the necessity of democratizing the Middle East, right? The term despotism was created by Montesquieu looking at the Ottoman Empire, and building this sense of European politics and the modernity of politics. You look at what the

Ottoman Empire was at the time, it was such a sophisticated political system, you can use any term you want, but the term despotism for sure didn't retribute that.

So what I'm trying to say here, okay for the literature, but not thinking that this literature did the real job of opening up the reality of men and women of flesh and blood in this society. It didn't. And it's okay, it's part of also building ourselves as Westerners. But the typical other of the West has always been the Muslim. So there is no real surprise today in seeing this building and projection amplified at the international level, for reasons also concrete that you can find in the political situation in the Muslim societies. But what I'm saying is that there is a repertoire here that you can trace back much much earlier.

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** These books existed in 1688, but if you go even earlier, even the first century of Islam, John al Kindi from Damascus wrote horrible books about Muhammad, peace be upon him, but these books were seen as academic, in terms of understanding the other, and fearing the other. It was read by scholars and readers, not by a commoner approach, which is the way it has been done now. The fact is that this, what we are dealing with today, this has come up on the recent events, in terms of making it much more publicly aware of what harm insult can do to the other.

**BENJAMIN BARBER:** You know it's kind of discouraging, I must say, we started a couple of days ago with the clash of civilizations, and Europe and the other, and Muslims as immigrants, and I thought over the last several days we'd explored the actual realities of Muslims as Europeans, in many cases for generations. We talked earlier this evening of Muslims in America

as African-Americans who've been here for many hundreds of years, and now we're sort of back to this tyranny of memory, going back to a time when—you're quite right, the typical other was the Muslim—but I thought we'd just spent time problematizing that, and I would love to see our debate now about humiliation and insult in the context of the fact that about a third of the Muslims in Germany and perhaps half of those in Holland are actually citizens of those countries, and are Dutch, or German, or French. They are the Muslim, they are Muslim Frenchmen, or Muslim Austrian, and so on. I think we need to go forward and not back. If memory becomes a tyranny that forces us back into those things, then I think it's a problem.

To me the issue here, and I think cartoons are a perfect example of it, the issue that's missing on the table—and maybe I see that because I'm a political scientist—

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** And because you're American and you're bold and brash.

**BENJAMIN BARBER:** Well that too yes. By the way it was okay when I said it, I'm not sure you should say it though.

The issue missing here is power. The issue of power. Offense, we all take offense, at all sorts of things. But the question is, is there power behind the offense? There is no parity between the words—excuse my descriptive use of them—nigger and honky. Because when a white man says nigger, there is a history of lynching, inequality, and slavery right in the background, and the threat of a lynching is always there even today. When black man says honky, he's spitting into the wind. I mean, so what? Does George Bush care if he's called a honky? The cartoons in

Copenhagen, to me, were a mistake, and have nothing to do with civil liberty, because the small minority of Muslims with no power were being humiliated in the name of free expression, by a large white majority. I say to those cartoonists, go to Riyadh, and publish your cartoons. That's fine, that's civil liberties, that's speaking up. And see you might get your head cut off, but that's what happens sometimes when you do that. But don't do it in Copenhagen where you're speaking for an oppressive majority and humiliating people with no power.

The power issue is absolutely crucial, and has to be factored into it. The founders of America said, the freedom of expression is an instrument of democracy, an instrument of power. It's not just there to say things, for any right to offend people. You offend people when you do it, on the way to trying to balance power. To take on power, and empower yourself. That has not been true in Europe. In Europe there is no parity between those who insult Muslims, and those who are, say, insulted by Muslims, or things that Muslims say and do. And that's it—the power issue is one that hasn't been on the table.

**BAS HEIJNE:** Yes, but I'm afraid it's even more complicated, because, what you say is absolutely right Benjamin, but the perception is, by a large growing group of people, who voted massively for the extreme right party in the European elections last week, for a man who wants to forbid the Quran, is that they see themselves as victims. Now we can say to them, that's nonsense, you're the one with the power, but they see themselves as overwhelmed.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** How do you interpret this?

**BAS HEIJNE:** I think the problem is—and that's why these conversations are so difficult—in Holland at least, but I think in more countries in Western Europe, the whole aversion to Islam, or Muslims, or immigrants, you could say, is part of a much larger problem. It has to do with globalization. The aversion against Europe nowadays, meaning the Union, is as strong as the aversion against Muslims. It's part of the fear of globalization, of something being lost: you have to give away something and you get nothing back. That's the rationale, if you could call it, behind this emotion. It's as strong as with Europe. You give something away, you don't get anything back. With Islam, Holland is not Holland anymore—that's the slogan. And they're not only the uneducated people, more and more people are saying that.

I think Holland is somewhat of a special case, but I think it's somewhat the same for the rest of Western Europe. Because of this liberal reputation for tolerance—you know, I don't think I have to explain that to this audience—Holland was very traditional. And now these people say, not only are our freedoms now affected, but also our identity. In the last panel I heard someone say, identity is not essential, and it's dynamic, identities change all the time. But these people would say, you know we heard that during the heydays of multiculturalism, we all know that. But we *want* our identities not to be dynamic. We want them to be firm. And also with some Muslims, the same emotion applies. They feel the same emotion, they say, we don't want to be dynamic, we want to be firm and we want to know who we are.

I think every attempt from above to say, we are in a pluralistic world and we all have multiple identities, we should celebrate diversity, is somehow catastrophic, because it comes from above. People say, we've heard that all before, now it's our turn. As much as I regret it in Holland, it's

very Difficult to answer this. Because they've heard all the arguments before, but they don't any longer apply. I think it's heading for a collision.

**KHALED FOUAD ALLAM:** Memory is not a concept. It has to do with recognition, with existence. Is a political question. For instance, those who are rejecting the entrance of Turkey into the European Union base their arguments on memory. They say that Turkey should not become a part of the European Union because it does not belong to the Western European memory. It's another world, it's the Orient, the mythical Orient.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Benjamin, you just came back from Turkey. Did you encounter this?

**BENJAMIN BARBER:** No, I did not. I want to embrace what you said. I want to join this issue, this is really important, because it's true. The fact is, I think white populists on the right, are, in a sense, also victims. There's no question. They're victims of modernity, they're victims of globalization, they're victims of multiculturalism as well. They see their monocultures, which they associate with memory and with who they are and where they come from going down the drain. They see a Europe constituted not by citizenship but by big corporations, and run by those corporations, that leaves them out. There's nothing more terrible than the war of the weak—the war of the disempowered Muslims against the disempowered working right. In the United States poor, white, southern workers out of a job blame Mexicans, they blame blacks. They guy who just killed somebody down in Washington is a desperate man, and certainly he's part of a group of disempowered Americans. It's right to say it's desperation, and disempowerment is not just a

feature of Muslim minorities. It's also a feature of traditional groups that were once quite powerful that aren't powerful anymore.

So the question is, how do we mediate that, so the weak don't turn on each other and devour each other, while the people who are inheriting the world—big corporations, big business, globalization—eats them both. That's becomes the political question. Right now, they feed on one another: right wing populists turn on the minorities, the minorities see the right wing class as their enemies, and that of course suits the elites very well.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** How is it we saw exactly the opposite in Turkey?

**BENJAMIN BARBER:** Well because what happened in Turkey, there's not time to do it properly, but Turkey has spent 60 years in the hands of the Kamalist nationalists who rejected Islam, who rejected the Ottoman Empire, and created a government around secularism, and around keeping Islam out. And then ten, fifteen years ago Muslims began to say, we want to be represented.

Muslims from outside the Istanbul area created their own party, the AKP. The AKP won power, and for a while, the Turkish nationalists, the Turkish Kamalists, the Turkish secularists said, this is the end of us. We're going to have this Islamicist revolution, they're going to take over, they're going to destroy our secularism and everything we Kamalists have been trying to achieve. But instead it turned out that these Muslims, quite moderate but wanting a political party, were simply another political party. And the recent elections actually reduced their power

somewhat by seven or eight points. So it turned out they could be defeated electorally. The army stayed out, thank God. The army has been the sort of nationalist constitution keeper. When it sees something happen that gets in the way of Kamalism it's always intervened. It didn't this time, and thank God it didn't.

But the result is Turkey represents I think, an extraordinary place for hope for a moderate integration of secularism and Islam.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Ben is going to keep the dial of hope up, which is good because after all, we want to get beyond the fracture. Jocelyn?

**JOCELYN CESARI:** I wanted to go back to this fractured Europe, to present how you go beyond the fracture. What we have done—when I say we it's because the Islam in the West program that I coordinate put together an initiative across Europe, and America as well, to provide information and knowledge that can be used in a different way to communicate. If you want to see that, you can go to the Euro Islam website, where we put up these different resources that can be to communicate by politicians, journalists, we are talking about media. The site is very much used by journalists by the way.

So what we do there is we tell people, you have to unpack things that are put together all the time about Islam and Europe, and it has been done in these three days actually, no critique intended, in the sense that—

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Please, I welcome it.

**JOCELYN CESARI:** —we say all the time in the communication, we have to insist on the non-exceptionalism of Islam and Muslims. This is very important, that Islam is not an exceptional religion and Muslims are not exceptional human beings, in no way. So what does it mean? It means that we put together immigration, socio-economic problem, ethnicity, and international constraints, all together packed, and under these terms, under these three dimensions, we have built what is called the “Islam in Europe issue.” I want to unpack that.

Why? Because in Europe, unlike America—and I live in this country and it's very important to make the transatlantic comparison—most of immigrants are Muslims. So when Europeans talk

of immigration they have only Islam in mind, while Islam is not the issue. The issue is the issue that is also discussed in America, but not with Muslims in mind, with Mexicans in mind. And this is something important to do, to unpack that.

Because in a country like the Netherlands, it's also discussed in Germany, it's also discussed in France now—because of this obsession with Islam, what politicians are doing is issue new laws of immigration that ask the newcomers to fit into the liberal core values. Usually you immigrate and you adapt, right? to the core values of the country to which you are coming. Now they are tested before, on issues like tolerance for homosexuality, tolerance for sexual promiscuity, and things like that. What does it mean? It means that the newcomer in the Netherlands will have to see pictures of naked people all along the beach, or homosexuals kissing, and test his capacity to accept this or not. This is because Europeans think all immigrants are Muslims, and then they have to be put aside, in case they come in too big numbers to change the balance of these values. So this is one important thing, we have to disentangle Islam and immigration.

Second, we have to also disentangle the question of Islam and socioeconomic poverty. If you go across Europe, if you talk about the banlieues in France, the ghetto here and there, everybody thinks that Islam is the reason for the disenfranchisement. We are talking in this program to Muslims of flesh and blood all over, and young people from this background are saying, we are victimized because of Islam. This is not true. They have also, the young people, to overcome this particular discourse. And one reason we are interacting in all these situations is to tell them, you can take advantage of this situation as well, and not put Islam as a label on your front, on your forehead. And this is something that is built, again, in this mutual interaction that doesn't make

the distinction between and immigrant and Islam or Muslims, between someone with a socioeconomic problem and someone who is a Muslim. And this has been built over ten—I came from France a few years ago, 20 years in the case of France. How can you explain in some banlieues in France someone who is fourth generation of Algerian background can still be considered an *immigré maghribain*, an immigrant from North Africa, when he speaks French, he dreams in French, he dresses French, he doesn't speak Arabic—there is something bizarre. He will define, or she will define herself as a *maghribaine*. So this is the point here.

And the third point is about ethnicity and culture. We have really to address the issue of Islam as a religion. All Europeans today are dancing around the fire, they are not addressing it. In the Netherlands the question is, how can we accommodate multicultural differences when those multicultural differences leads to tolerance of beating wives? This is cultural behavior, this is not Islam, and nobody is listening to some clerics, especially in the UK, who are saying, beating your wife is not part of Islam. It's patriarchal attitude, and it's about time to make the difference.

And this is also important, we don't listen to Muslims. So I'm going to listen to you.

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** I'm glad we agree that we should not be prisoners of a past. We must learn lessons of our mistakes in the past and move on. If we take Holland as an example—because I am a regular visitor to the Netherlands, and I have been an advisor there to a number of institutions, including police and others—they were the most liberal, democratic, secular society in the whole European country, until they brought the people from Suriname on the limited visa, called guest worker, on a limited period for two to three years, but never took seriously that these

people will marry, and will have children, and will have schools and mosques, and never planned about anything else. When the population grew of the second and third generation, they started panicking, that we cannot enter into their areas. And here I come, in Utrecht, and there I go, seeing those communities, where Dutch police cannot even enter. I say, why do you think that way? Why don't you hire these Algerian and North African people and make them interpreters, so you can go between? And visit Morocco, live six months there, learn the terminologies of the language, and the culture, and see how they perform. And six years later I go in the same town thing, and there is a no-go area, half the police officers have been deployed in that area, and I have to take six police officers from England to show them the model, that while the problem you are facing here is racism in the UK, go and learn from the Dutch how to do it. Their problem is they never planned, how 30, 40 years later how the community would look.

The deep rooted issue, as I said, is that hate is linked with racism. Because of the issue of race equality laws in the UK for example, and the multiculturalism we were talking about, color racism was very known in the US, but cultural racism was known in Europe—cultural racism based on the way we live. I totally agree that immigration and religion matters, and especially social and cultural circumstances, lack of jobs, created a fear. But that was not the real fear. Fear was exactly what Benjamin said—about power, and their coming. If they are coming, where will we go? Cause they are the people who are more religious—more people pray on Fridays than all of Europe pray together, for the whole year! That is the fact that has come up by many sources, again and again. That causes them to fear.

Somebody told me, when after the prayer you say *bismillah alhamdulillah allahu akbar* [in the name of God, praise be to God, God is great]—these are your tasbeeh, your meditation—actually you frighten us all, because it means you are preparing for something. This is the issue that goes back to ignorance, which we were earlier talking about. A lot of these things are misunderstood, because of people not understanding academically what the issues are.

Issues, when we are talking about segregation, radicalization, youth alienation, that's again captive because of the generation gap. Some Muslims, stupidly, do not really live in the country where they are. They are still living somewhere else, and that causes the problem. That happened in Holland, that happened in England, that happened in Germany, that happened in France. So we need to address then, social cultural issues with the economic difficulties.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** So I wonder how we do that. I wonder if integration is a goal. I wonder if the characterization that Jocelyn gave of Holland, and of people coming there and having to see these images and react to them is accurate—

**BAS HEIJNE:** Well the way she said it, it looked like they were forced to watch a kind of porn movie. There is one picture of naked breasts I think only.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Only. We heard only.

**BAS HEIJNE:** Well that's very normal in Holland to show your breasts. And that's why everybody feels threatened now. There's a reaction going on in Holland, and it's also a crisis of

self image. I think that society for a long time knew where it was going, or thought it knew where it was going. They were strong believers in Europe, strong believers in multiculturalism, and strong believers in liberalism, personal freedom. I think everyone knows Holland for personal freedom. You can have gay marriage, euthanasia, drugs are tolerated—*were* tolerated, not hard drugs, you always have to say that. But for a long time everyone looked at it as, well, there is not a lot of debate about these personal issues. But they are all about personal freedom. They are not about community, about what makes a country work.

I think now, about all these questions resurface, and the Dutch feel generally, well we have nothing left to fall back on. So that I think is the reaction in Holland. They reinvent nationalism, they reinvent a kind of personal identity, national identity. There's a lot of debate I won't bore you with, about a new Museum that has to be built about national history. Because no one has cared about national history in Holland for a long time, and suddenly the debate is all about that. So the debate is not only about Muslims, and rightly. It's about, you know, we don't know who we are.

And perhaps, I think a lot of Dutch Muslims don't know who they are, they feel lost in a sense. I know a lot of Moroccan Dutch youth who are in doubt. They have problems at home. There is a generation gap. They have lots of trouble with their fathers, sons mostly, also girls. They don't know where to look. Some of them, they fall back on Islamism, on strong identity. So that's happening, and they're very Dutch in that sense. Everybody feels insulted, everybody feels humiliated, everybody feels lost in a way.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** So I wonder, the very Dutchness that you're describing, might it find a solution now, looking abroad? Looking towards America, towards a certain multicultural model, which I know is geared toward Benjamin Barber. So I'm wondering in some way what is the inspiration—and I want to get, obviously, to the Cairo speech of Obama—the inspiration that the Europeans now are feeling coming out of America. Having recently been in Lyon, France, it was amazing and tremendous to me to feel the French envious of America. I mean, it's something I have never experienced before. All of a sudden, at least in my life, I have never felt such admiration and such love, and "*l'amérique*," and it was said with a huge smile.

**BAS HEIJNE:** Usually that's called manic depressive. To go from this way to that way in such a short time is a sign of manic depressiveness, so it's very unsure what will happen here. But I think you're absolutely right. Usually Holland loves America, and not only culturally. For the last eight years there was a wave of neoconservatism also in Holland. You would expect now that there were signs, because Obama is much loved in Holland, but Dutch society now resembles when we talked about Denmark in the last section, or Austria—they feel very small, closed in, claustrophobic, and that's been going on for eight years.

The mayor of Rotterdam is a Muslim Moroccan. That's of course quite unusual in the rest of Europe. But then, mayors are not elected in Holland, so it's from the top down. And 22% of the people of Rotterdam voted for the extreme right party in the European elections. So that's the paradox that needs to be explored.

**KHALED FOUAD ALLAM:** There is a general problem in Europe, that we don't know how to politically address problem of cultural diversity. Cultural diversity has to be dealt with politically. So obviously, there is a problem between cultural diversity and democracy. But cultural diversity doesn't only mean Islam. I studied very closely the eruptions in the banlieues in France, and they had absolutely nothing to do with Islam, it had everything to do with rights, with rights to work, with social protection. In Europe right now we're living a kind of schizophrenia: on the one hand you have the strong heterogeneity of cultures, but do not know how to invent a political language for that cultural diversity, which makes the current situation very complicated. It leads to an exponential growth in populism. But I would like to remind everyone that populism is an open door to political violence.

I live in Trieste, two kilometers away from the former Yugoslavia, and I can still witness today the disasters of the cultural conflicts there. In the city of Mostar, at the elementary school, the Muslim children enter through one door, and the Catholic children enter through another door. This is something we obviously have to avoid if we want to avoid the disaster. This is why I think that hope is fundamental also in the reign of politics. But there are historical precedents we should not hide, between the United States and Europe for example. The genesis of the nation in Europe was based on the close relationship between self identity and religious identity. Whereas the American nation was based on cultural diversity. What we don't have in Europe is a kind of constitutional patriarch-ism. But it can't exist because there is no European constitution. So when a nation falls back, in a sense, the whole European Union falls back on itself, which is very dangerous.

**BENJAMIN BARBER:** Coming right off of Fouad's comments, which I think are exactly to the point, and coming back to your concern with the populist right, I want to defend populism. I want to defend right wing populism, even. Defend it, or at least explain it in ways that is a kind of defense. Right wing populism is the politics of the disempowered. In this case they happen to be the formerly powerful—the nationalists, the people who ran the state. But they are now, in their own way, economically deeply disempowered.

The Socialist party, every one of its leaders supported the European constitution, which was a 480-page legal document that no one but lawyers could read. It was advanced in the name of democracy, but had little, in fact, to do with democracy. Seventy percent of Socialist party membership voted against the constitution. They didn't see it as an instrument of democratization, they saw it as a further instrument of their own de-democratization as part of the democratic deficit, and by the way, I think they were right, and their leaders wrong—the way that constitution had been written, and what it's intentions were.

Right before Martin Luther King Jr. was killed, he made an extraordinary statement. You might remember he had this project, I think it was called Operation Bread Basket, which was organized around food and economic equality. He said, if poor blacks and the poor whites who despise them ever understood what they had in common, how much they shared, we would have a real American revolution. Martin Luther King was in effect defending, in a certain way, the very poor whites who were the core of American racists. But their racism was an unfortunate, unhealthy, and irrational reaction to their powerlessness. And of course those who did well in America were

delighted to see poor whites and poor blacks despise one another while they went on running the country and running the world.

We have a rather similar situation today in Europe. The elites who are running Europe are very pleased, I think, in their own way, to see immigrant Muslims attacked by right wing populists, and right wing populists recognizing a democratic deficit, seeing themselves as disempowered, because the war of the weak insulates the strong and allows them to move their globalizing agenda forward.

Here's my question then—is there a politics in Europe or America that can embrace both of those parties, and what does it look like? It won't be a cultural party for sure, it won't be a party based on religion. But if it's based on economics, if it's based on a recognition and appreciation of political and economic power, it's not impossible that such a thing will happen.

Let me end with an anecdote. I worked with Clinton in the 90s, and the most amazing thing Clinton ever said was in a debate at Camp David, and was right after the Democrats had been defeated overwhelmingly by the Newton Gingrich vote that took over the House in 1994. Hillary, along with a bunch of other people, was saying to Bill Clinton, it's time you stop defending the poor whites of Arkansas and the poor whites of the south. You owe them nothing, they're the ones who robbed you of their power, they're the ones who New Gingrich won. So Bill Clinton said, until America reaches the point where we do not put the progress of blacks and Hispanics on the backs of poor whites, and make them pay the price of that progress, we will never have civil peace, and we will never have a genuine progressive party. He didn't figure out

quite how to do it, though interestingly he had the core support of the black community, and he had the widespread support of poor southern whites, so-called crackers. He found a way around his personality to bring them together. I'm not sure he discovered a politics that worked.

We're now back again in the situation where white populists in America, unemployed union members, are seeing Mexican immigrants as their enemy and so on. But the immigrants in Europe and the immigrants in America are here because of the laws of economics. Because the elite corporations need their labor and want it cheap, and draw them here. Then of course that creates friction within the internal population. That's happening in Europe the same way.

So I don't have an answer, but I have a question—is there a form of politics that allows the so-called dangerous populist right and the disempowered immigrant Muslim and other communities to find a common politics? If that happens, as Martin Luther King said, then we will have a genuine progressive politics.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Let's try to answer that question. It's a good challenge, thank you very much.

**BAS HEIJNE:** It's a good question, but only in part, because it's not only economics. It's not only the poor white, it's the middle class who has become revolutionary in Holland. So it's not only a question of poor against poor, or disadvantaged against disadvantaged—that's part of it; if you see the results of the elections, in Rotterdam the people are disadvantaged. Also though, it's much more a question of identity than economics in the end.

We talked about Turkey. The paradox is, Turkey is not part of the Western European memory, but most of the voters for these right wing parties go on holiday to Turkey every year, so they know it quite well. That's one of the paradoxes. They love it there. But when the issue comes up, do you want Turkey to be part of Europe? They say, no!

So there are lots of paradoxes. I think it's the abstract idea, versus the reality. And I think we should make use of these paradoxes that are all over the place.

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** I think the answer to Ben's question is two-fold. First of all, unless the new generation, European or American, is engaged in active politics and become part of the system, as a participatory democracy, things will not change. The fact is this: why the far right parties won major cities in Europe is for 2 reasons. Seventy percent of the citizens are not interested in voting today. Why? Because they think things will not change through the ballot. And that is the fact in the whole of Europe. That's why far right parties, minority parties—no one wants them—but they are there. And the main parties are so disunited that their votes cross over each other, so that the smaller far right parties and individuals can win, including in London.

**Nick Griffin, one of the BNP Fascist Party leaders??,** is going to sit as an MEP in Europe, even though he wanted to bulldoze Europe! That's what the purpose of his party is. We're coming to the point which we were earlier talking about—things have to change, in religious leadership, in political leadership, in economic leadership. We are in the economic crisis because

of greed. Unless we go to the moral values, and go to the basics, nothing is going to change in Europe, and nothing is going to change in America. We will keep poor money in, but then money is being sucked in a hole, rather than giving any benefit to the wider community, where our poor whites and our poor blacks are not going to be uplifted from economic misery where they're living. So we need to think for the future. Future lies in partnership, in cooperation, in dialogue, in diplomacy. Not in jingoism, not power, not authority, not that we have might, and might can change the world. That's not going to happen.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** So you're really taking us where we want to go, which is, where do we go from here? Which is the name of this discussion, this conclusion. I would like each one of you, in closing—and then open it a little to the audience so we don't keep them here all night—I want to get a sense from you, what are some, if not solutions, then at least some opportunities that make us go beyond a fractured state?

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** Two sentences. First of all, we go back to our citizenship, rule of law, constitution, fundamental rights, in Europe as well as many other countries. At the moment it is the minority power who is dominating the culture within Europe. That has to change. We don't have a constitution, I totally agree, but we have laws. And laws are always good. I'm not saying any single law in Europe is bad, except where there is clear discrimination in employment and other places. There are a few pockets which need to be changed. The OIC, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, British Council, and many other institutions including the EU and the European Commission, are doing something good, but only on paper. I need actions. Where there is a mouth, there have to be some resources so that the

people can choose. Educational institutions should teach about anti-Semitism in classes. In all secondary school this should be compulsory, because this is a plague of Europe, as I said earlier. Similarly, racism against Muslims, which is the sharp end of racism, has to be understood properly. Why? It may be economic reasons, but still, it needs to be understood so the next generation and the generations after do not face the problem that was faced in the last century.

**JOCELYN CESARI:** There is a paradox in Europe. We have looked at the amount of money that has been put into the politics of integration across Europe. It's huge. It's huge. I do not want this American audience thinks that nothing is being done. There has been huge amounts of Euros and pounds put in the last 15 years in trying to integrate through education.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** I was wondering whether integration is a goal.

**JOCELYN CESARI:** Yes. And even politically, it's true that nationally Muslims are not represented, but locally they are very much present. Fouad is a good example, the mayor of Rotterdam is a good example. So Muslims are there. But at some point, what is now at the core issue is how do we put Islam in the public culture of all our countries? And this is not done, in the sense that yes, we like Muslims when they partake in our values, but how much of the values of Islam are we ready to teach to the whole population, not only to Muslims?

It's a problem of education—Islam should not be two pages in the textbook when all the population are coming from the former colonies of all the European countries, or historical ties.

It has to be part of the history. Fouad is right. Memory is not in the past. Memory is what your children are learning today in school, and Islam is not part of that.

It's also part of political communication. How do politicians communicate today about Islam? It's still part of this ghettoization and separation in Europe, and in this regard indeed Obama looks like a wonderful example, a counter-positive example of what should be done to be more inclusive. And this is not done. It has nothing to do with Muslim X, Y, or Z trying to get into the system. It's a symbolic change that is related to communication and to changing the public culture. We're talking about the example of African-Americans—each group in this country has really changed the public culture, be part of it. This is what should be done today for Muslims—not immigrants, but Muslims. Because converts are encountering the same kind of issues sometimes.

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** Two points, quickly. I would like to say that Jocelyn is right to say that it is important that Muslims should be part of it, but Islam *has* been part of Europe, for centuries. Seven hundred years in Andalusia, Spain, showed a model of Christians, Muslims, Jews working together, because it was dominated by Muslims, and Muslims always have integrated culturally, and academically, and also knowledge-wise to incorporate others. Muslims have always learned from others. And it's not being done at the moment because they are being seen as a threat. I think we have to address that, and build trust and confidence. I always say to my Prime Ministers, you cannot impose something on them, you have to build the trust and confidence of your citizens, so they can become eye and ear against the evil of extremism and the evil of terrorism.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Have they listened to you?

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** Well, sometimes, not all the time. They have their own worries. That is what my fear about President Obama is. He is inspirational. He is saying that we have to start a new beginning with the world of Islam, and with Muslims. Will somebody allow him to do it? Is there behind that an action plan that will do what he wanted to do? Will the settlements stop today? Things like that that he is asking for.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** You mean settlements in Israel and Palestine?

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** In Israel, yes. Because in the West Bank at the moment, there are thousands of settlements—illegal settlements—and nobody accepts that, because it's occupied land. How are we going to get that free to make viable, sustainable Palestinian state? That is where the radicalization of Muslim youth in Europe is coming up. It is foreign policy issues again. Abu Ghraib was a part of it. Dominance is a part of it. Our jingoism, militarism is part of it. While the military is needed in, what we call it, surgical operations, you need a parallel diplomacy in order to get a debate going for the participation of the people. When we liberated Kuwait, why did we not put a condition that there should be some sort of democratic institution built up for the local citizens? We never did that. It's our mistakes as well. We must learn from our mistakes, and not repeat them in the future.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Bas, you have a solution to all this.

**BAS HEIJNE:** Yes I have. Part of the solution is to better understand the paradoxes that are caught up with identity, self esteem. To make a compliment to the US, I think they've understood, it's better here. When you have a sense of self, or identity, cultural identity, you can use that to maneuver in a better way in a society that is plural. And I think that's one of the main, on the level of politics, on the level of grassroots, on the bases that feel disenfranchised, they feel, we cannot be Dutch anymore, or, we cannot be a good Muslim anymore. If you make space—and of course, how much space will be hotly debated—to give people a sense of self, there is much more cosmopolitan.

A true cosmopolitan is also a provincial. That is often seen as contradictory, but I think if you have a sense of self, a sense of place—in Holland that's always seen as quite nasty, because it's opening the doors to nationalism, to exclusion of others, but I think it's understood here, better, that you need to have a sense of self, of space, to be a better multiculturalist, or better cosmopolitan. That's the basis of any discussion of integration, identity, nationalism, and so forth.

**KHALED FOUAD ALLAM:** Aside from the question of Islam and Europe, there is a big question before world today. The way we respond to this will have important consequences. It's a very simple question to state, but a very difficult one to resolve: how to live together? When I was in parliament I worked a lot on questions of immigration and citizenship, and integration. Politics, and the way politics deals with these is one of the answers. Aside from politics, there is something else, and this something else has to do with psychology, with affection, the affective

dimension. In reality, human beings need love. Without this affective motor, it will be hard for us to find a political solution for these problems, which would leave the doors wide open to violence and hatred. I'm aware, however, we are in a situation of danger.

The great German poet Hölderlin said in one of his poems, there where danger grows, salvation grows.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** I'm glad you didn't leave us on the word hate. How do we live together? I think that's one of the basic questions before us?

**BENJAMIN BARBER:** For a thousand years there's been an answer to that question, and unfortunately it hasn't been love, because there isn't enough of that to allow us to live together. The answer has been democracy, and democracy is a word that has to do with power. It's about sharing power. The only way to live together is sharing power. That's why I come back to the democratic deficit as Europe's problem. Europe's problem now is, more than anything else, is a democratic deficit, experienced both by Muslims and minorities and immigrants, as well as experienced by a lot of traditional working class folks who feel they're dislocated in a globalizing world, in a multicultural world, where their values and backgrounds are irrelevant, and they feel genuinely disempowered. You have in fact two groups on the opposite sides of the political spectrum who share a single experience, and that's the experience of being utterly disempowered. What they share is the democratic deficit. I guess that's the crucial question—whether that democratic deficit can be overcome.

Part of the democratic deficit has resulted from a fact that we haven't talked about—30 or 40 years of market model that has said, politics and democracy aren't important, markets solve problems, governments create problems, and that a privatized, commercialized market world is all we need to solve our problems. For anyone who still believes that after the September crisis, maybe one of the psychiatrists who was here earlier can offer you some services. But quite clearly, the market paradigm as a paradigm of power, has failed. We are back to beginning to understand that government and politics—shared power—is the way to do it.

So the question now becomes—the conundrum we face is, is it possible to develop a democratic paradigm that includes those from the past who were once, if you like, dominant—those Americans, and Dutch, and Frenchmen, who feel they've lost their history, they've lost their people, they've lost their values because of this new world, and blame it on the newcomers who seem to come with that world. They blame it on multiculturalism because that seems to be the problem, but in fact multiculturalism is itself a factor that results from interdependence, a global economy, people following the labor market to where the jobs are. Can these two groups, dislocated on both sides, find a common politics? That's the question.

People here kept saying right wing populism, but there are parts of right wing populism that are very attractive. American fundamentalists on the right at least care about values other than the ones Hollywood proposes. That's interesting. More importantly, they care about the stewardship of the earth—there are a lot of people on the right, like New Gingrich, who are obsessed with the environment. They also care about economic equality, that comes out of Christian tradition as

well. There are things the left can share with them. There are many things we can't share clearly, but finding the commonalities is possible.

It's the same thing in Europe. If those who are voting right now stop blaming the *product* of globalization—namely a multicultural Europe with labor and immigration from other countries—and begin figuring out what they share in common—namely a common powerlessness and a common democratic deficit, in the face of corporations, banks, global markets built on the global market mythology—then I think there's the possibility of the kind of politics that Clinton imagined that day at Camp David, when he was thinking about a politics where poor blacks and poor whites could work together, the kind that Martin Luther King was thinking about.

That's why Obama is so refreshing. Not because finally a black man is in the White House, not even because multiculturalism is in the White House. But because black Americans and white Americans finally voted for someone whose color was not the critical feature. Had it been, he wouldn't have won. But something else was the feature—the sense that Americans held something else in common. And that's why I think his politics seem so promising to Europe, and why the *politics* of empowerment, the politics of democracy, are crucial. A lot of people attribute our problems to an absence of democracy, or too much democracy, or democracy gone wrong. Jefferson said a long time ago, the remedies for the abuses and ills of democracy is more democracy. What Europe desperately needs right now is more democracy.

**JOCELYN CESARI:** I completely agree with that, but to make this happen, some basic social processes have to be changed, and it means educating people differently, socializing differently—

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** Creating equality between men and women.

**JOCELYN CESARI:** Yes, but it's also what you put in the mind of these European citizens. Unfortunately what's in their mind and what's articulated politically today doesn't reflect this aspiration toward more democracy. It's part of the issue here. You cannot just have wishful thinking. There are basic processes, and again, they don't concern Muslims, they concern the whole society. And this is unfortunately not happening right now.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** The wishful thinking seems to be quite in action. I think that maybe one can use words like wishful thinking—

**JOCELYN CESARI:** But what I am saying is, can someone mention the equivalent of Obama in any European country? It doesn't exist. It's based on a process of deep change in this country. Look at the way American society has gone from the 60s to now. It's not just one person talking, it's a deep process of change. What I'm saying, coming from Europe and living here, I'm not seeing this happening yet in Europe.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** I think the divide is also between American and Europe, in this particular conversation.

**JOCELYN CESARI:** Yes, but I have a foot in both—

**BENJAMIN BARBER:** Moi aussi.

**KHALED FOUAD ALLAM:** Democracy grows if there is a climate to allow it to grow. This climate is fundamental to make democracy grow. To day in Europe there is a climate of pessimism, which makes democracy even more complicated. So yes, Obama is a hope for world in that sense.

**BAS HEIJNE:** I agree with you, but you should be careful with the language of humanism, because it is easily defeated. There has to be a policy behind it. I've been to India in the slums, and there were Hindu women who were very poor. They said, why is there this war between Muslims and Hindus if the blood in our veins is the same? So on and so on. We of course agreed. Then after five minutes they said, you know they are taking all our jobs! I sat with Palestinians and Israelis, and they said, we are all human. They were all agreeing with each other, but the moment you say, now we're going to draw the frontier, it's war again. So I think this language of humanism—and I *hope* that with Obama it will work—but it's also dangerous in a sense. If he doesn't deliver, then the reaction will be vengeance.

**BENJAMIN BARBER:** I just want to say, Obama is not about humanism—it's about politics and interest, and the perception of shared interest. What he did is get a lot of Americans to see that across the boundaries of race the they previously had divided on, they understood they had

common interests that allowed them to support him. I'm saying in Europe too there are common interests, not yet perceived, but when they are, there will be a new politics possible that's like this politics.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** You know I think you were mentioning Hölderlin, and I'd like to Kafka, which I'll invert. Kafka said, there is hope but not for us. I actually tend to believe, despite the pessimism and optimism that runs in this panel, that there is hope, and there might even be hope for us. Thank you very much.

**(applause)**

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** If there is an appetite for questions, we'll take a few. Let me say something about questions—questions are questions, rather than comments, and they usually last about 48 seconds. Go ahead.

**Q:** My question is for the Imam. I'm curious whether you think Sharia law has a future in the UK or anywhere else in Europe. If so, in what form? And is this a good or bad thing?

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** You were not here probably in my first intervention on Tuesday, where I said that Sharia is most misunderstood in our western world—in Europe and in America. Sharia is not about penal code, which sometimes is very much misunderstood as well. Sharia is to determine one's life according to the will God. For example, in Britain in 2003, the British government made a Sharia code in economics, and they made one section of Bank of

England according to Sharia compliance, in which £32 billion came into Britain from the Muslim world. That is a Sharia which we want. On marriage, birth and death, and hospitals and prisons, it has to do with personal law that needs to be protected, where British parliament in 1937 and 1939 made a Sharia Act—it is still in our statute. If we want that to be implemented in a Muslim's private and personal life, which doesn't affect anyone, but Muslims are subject to the law of the land, that's paramount. Sharia law will not be contradictory to the law of the land. That really is paramount.

In my opinion, mutuality is needed, so that minorities feel comfortable in the societies where they live, and participate under one rule of law, not two rules of law. It is the same law which will work with Britain, and also Europe. It will make a lot of progress, and help us all in not misunderstanding. Our problem is, as we discussed in our earlier session, media, and also some ignorant and arrogant politicians who don't know what they're talking about. Our British media nearly crucified our Archbishop of Canterbury, and also our Exchequer, when they mentioned that Sharia is implement-able in Britain, because we like the best of the Sharia to be implemented in Britain. We didn't say it, we didn't ask the Archbishop of Canterbury to speak for us, and neither did we ask our Exchequer to do so. They have made their own research, and they find the benefit of it.

Sharia should not be frightening to any Westerner whatsoever. Do not take the Taliban or the Saudis as the best example, they are what we call smelly eggs, we throw it away. We don't eat smelly eggs, we throw them away. For God's sake, don't take bad examples of Muslims and implement it on us.

**JOCELYN CESARI:** I would like to add something on this particular question. The debate is exactly what we're discussing here—very politicized, and doesn't reflect the reality of law in the European countries. I'll just give you an example: Sharia is already part of the debate in all courts, because Sharia—in Europe, not only in the UK—is about marriage, divorce, custody of children, and finance. And now because of the economic crisis there is a lot of interest in bringing Islamic finance more prominent, and Islamic banking more prominent, even for non-Muslims. So this is Sharia law in Europe.

It would be very misleading to think Muslims in Europe are claiming the creation of an Islamic state. We have plenty of surveys showing that this is not the case. We cannot duplicate the debate on Islam and the state in the Muslim world, in the US. It doesn't work this way. Sharia doesn't mean cutting heads and hands.

**IMAM ABDULJALIL SAJID:** That's never been practiced even in the Islamic world.

**JOCELYN CESARI:** There are different ways—the Sharia of Morocco is different from the Sharia of Pakistan and so on and so on. And Muslims are aware of that. What they are trying to negotiate is if the divorce is religious divorce, if the inheritance goes by the laws of inheritance, and all that. It doesn't mean there are no conflicts, there are conflicts, but it's in the family and it's about equality between men and women in the family. This is the big conflict when it comes to Sharia law, but not the political aspect of it.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** One more good question, and from a former panelist. Please.

**Q:** Hi. Hasni Abidi from Switzerland. I think we need more time in Europe, because the presence of Muslims in Europe is about 45 years, and it's nothing in time of nations. We need time to make our presence. This is point number one. Point number two, there is no democratic deficit in Europe. We can be members, we can be elected, we can vote, and this is very important for us. Third point, as a European Muslim, I don't feel the history of cartoons as intimidation for Muslims. I feel intimidation when I see pictures from Guantanamo Bay, the pictures in Abu Ghraib, but the Danish cartoons are not intimidating for me. Absolutely no. This is maybe a form of free expression. I can take my lawyer as a form of injustice, maybe discrimination, but not as humiliation. This is very important. The phenomenon of Islamic experience in Europe is very new, we can't compare the Muslim experience in Europe with the Afro-American experience in the US. Thank you.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** One last question here, right in the front. And make it a *great* question, no pressure. A great, concise, precise, something that wraps it up, and leaves us in the middle of pessimism and optimism. Go ahead.

**Q:** I am from Vienna, a political scientist. I have got one question for Ms. Jocelyn Cesari. I completely agree with what you said, that it's the socio-economic problems that are overlapped by religious discourse, it's not religious problems. But I have one question. You said Muslims should not see themselves as victims, but in some countries you have these definitely religious problems Muslims are facing. Take for instance the question of wearing the headscarf in school

in France, take for instance the ban of wearing the headscarf in different job opportunities, especially in the state in Germany, take for instance the ban of mosques and minarets in two out of nine districts in Austria, and the same debate having begun before that in Switzerland. So out of that, how can a Muslim not see himself as victim? although I in general agree with what you said. Thank you.

**JOCELYN CESARI:** When I was talking about victimization, it's to see yourself as completely deprived of resources despite these difficulties. I think it's important to keep a proactive mentality. We have discussed with 500 Muslims across Europe last year. What came in this discussion was clearly the sense that some people don't even try anymore, while there are resources they can still use. They think that they're not going to get any kind of promotion or better education, because they are Muslim. They don't even try anymore, in the sense that they are reproducing some kind of malfunction or dysfunction in the place where they live, because they say, what's the point? If I try to get out of the ghetto, no one's going to give me a chance because I am a Muslim. There was a quite interesting debate. It was not a dominant trend in the discussion in the groups we convened all over Europe, and there were some other Muslims responding to that and objecting to that. So I think it's a real debate today among Muslims themselves. It's not me putting the victimization on them, it's what came from their own voices, and this is a Muslim Voices event, so I wanted to say that it's not me here.

**PAUL HOLDENGRÄBER:** I would like to thank all the panelists for their attentiveness and for the dialogue we had now. I would like to also thank the European Union National Institutes of Culture. For the last time I will say it, their acronym is EUNIC, and it's been a pleasure working

with them. It's been a pleasure working with them with 19 European countries. As I've said it's made me age by 19 years, but I feel as though I've learned a lot, and I hope you have as well.

Thank you very much.